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Rhode Island’s Voluntary 
Restructuring of Solvent Insurers Law 
and Similar Efforts in Other States 
 
Matthew Gendron, Esq.* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article discusses a small, but unique, area of insurance 
law—voluntary restructuring—in the smallest state, Rhode 
Island. This Article begins with the initiative that led Rhode 
Island to address this topic, and then looks at the two methods of 
voluntary restructuring currently available in Rhode Island, as 
well as the two methods’ influences. Next, this Article goes on to 
describe the Rhode Island process and the single time the courts 
have addressed this law. Finally, this Article will discuss activity 
in other states to adopt alternative voluntary restructuring laws. 
Before diving in, some nomenclature may be helpful. Insurers 
write contracts and sell them to policyholders. The contracts1 
delineate when and how much the insurer must pay in the case of 
a fortuitous event, and how much the policyholder must pay in 
 
 
 
* Matthew Gendron is an attorney for the Rhode Island Department of 
Business Regulation, but is writing this Article outside of that capacity. He 
expresses his appreciation to Beth Dwyer and Jack Broccoli for their 
continued willingness to talk about this and many other topics, to his loving 
wife Julie for her endless patience, and to Tommy, Charlie, and Robby for 
being the best kinds of distractions. And to Katelyn Kalmbach for still 
wanting to hear more about insurance. 
1. Most insurance contracts are traditionally contracts of adhesion. See 
John Aloysius Cogan, Jr., Readability, Contracts of Recurring Use, and the 
Problem of Ex Post Judicial Governance of Health Insurance Policies, 15 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 93, 98 (2010). 
 
470 
 2018] INSURANCE LAW 471 
premium in exchange for the coverage.2 There are times that 
insurers or policyholders seek to change their contracts, and if 
both parties agree, the contract can be novated. There could also 
be a reason that the insurer and policyholder would agree to end 
the coverage. In such an instance, the parties could agree to 
commute the policy.3 Insurers sometimes seek protection of their 
own policies from “reinsurers,” where the reinsurer assumes a 
portion of the risk written by the insurer. A “run-off company” is 
an insurer that is no longer writing new business. Insurance is a 
highly regulated area, and the decision to cease new offerings 
could be voluntary (such as a decision to focus on other areas) or 
involuntary (as part of a regulator’s plan to turn around a  
troubled company, the regulator might order the company to stop 
writing new business).4 Whatever the reason for the run-off 
status, many insurers have considerable assets in a run-off 
business,5 to the point that there is now plenty of competition 
among insurance groups that specialize in managing run-off books 
of business for other companies.6 In the context of voluntary 
restructuring, “unlocking capital” is often referenced and refers  to 
 
 
2. For example, if Company A guaranteed to pay $1 to Policyholder B 
on January 1, 2020, without any other restrictions or provisos, that is not an 
insurance contract. For a contract of insurance to exist, there  must  be 
certain indicia, including a risk transferred between the parties. For  
example, if Company A agreed to pay Policyholder B $10 if Policyholder B 
was not able to dance on January 1, 2020, that would likely be considered 
insurance. See id. at 113–14. 
3. See Bill Goddard, The New World Order: Financial Guaranty 
Company Restructuring and Traditional Insurance Insolvency Principles, 6 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 137, 145–47 (2011) (providing an example of a 
fascinating situation where insurance commutations were well employed in 
helping the troubled mortgage insurer, Ambac, through its unique 
rehabilitation). 
4. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS RESTRUCTURING MECHANISMS FOR 
TROUBLED COMPANIES SUBGROUP OF THE FIN. CONDITION (E) COMMITTEE, 
ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR TROUBLED COMPANIES 5 (2010), 
http://www.naic.org/store/free/AMT-OP.pdf [hereinafter NAIC WHITE PAPER 
2010] (discussing considerations for a troubled insurer where they are put 
into “regulatory run-off”). 
5. See PWC, GLOBAL INSURANCE RUN-OFF SURVEY 3–4 (2018), 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/insurance/assets/pdf/global-insurance-run-off- 
survey-2018.pdf (indicating $350 billion in North American run-off assets and 
$380 billion more in the rest of the world). 
6. Id. at 11 (citing Berkshire Hathaway as well as five “run-off 
specialists”: Armour Re, Catalina, Enstar, R&Q, and RiverStone). 
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the capital that insurers must hold to pay possible future claims.7 
Insurers invest the premiums they receive and hope to earn 
money on their investments before claims must be paid.8 
In the United States, statutory accounting principles issued 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
provide guidance to insurers about the quantity and quality of 
capital the company should maintain to support its operations.9 
Insurers must hold capital to reserve against possible claims, 
sometimes for decades, tying up resources that could be used 
elsewhere, such as reinvesting in the company.10 Many of these 
cases are related to environmental or asbestos policies that were 
written with occurrence-based triggers that can seemingly last 
forever.11 In addition, long-term care insurance has been a 
developing area where insurers recently have been in regular need 
of additional reserves with the expectation of paying claims for 
decades on business written upwards of thirty years ago. For 
example, General Electric, the former lightbulb and consumer 
appliance giant that now focuses on jet engines and wind turbines, 
announced in January 2018 that it was planning to add fifteen 
billion dollars more in reserves to one of its insurance run-off 
subsidiaries for previously underpriced long-term care 
obligations.12 
 
 
7. John Winter, Unlocking Capital, INSIDER Q., Winter 2013–14, at 68. 
8. The NAIC issues and revises its Statements of Statutory Accounting 
Principles (SSAP) regularly and methodically. Recently, the NAIC issued a 
revision to SSAP No. 26R-Bonds, which amended several phrases in the 
seventeen-page description of insurance accounting rules that identify what 
securities should be considered bonds for insurance company investing 
purposes, because bonds are considered to be more secure for capital 
requirement purposes. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, EXPOSURE DRAFT 
SSAP NO. 26R-BONDS 4–5 (2017), http://www.naic.org/documents/cmte_e_ 
app_sapwg_exposure_13_36_ssap26r.docx. 
9. See id. at 5, 10. 
10. GE reignites breakup talk after $11 billion insurance, tax hit, BUS. 
INS. (Jan. 17, 2018, 8:25AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/ 
20180117/NEWS06/912318551/GE-reignites-breakup-talk-after-$11-billion- 
insurance,-tax-hit. 
11. See James A. Johnson, Long-Tail Liability Claims, 96 MICH. B.J. 28, 
28–29 (2017). 
12. Gen. Elec. Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 15, 2018) (noting 
General Electric’s plan to allocate $8.9 billion to future policy benefit 
reserves, incurring a $6.2 billion charge under GAAP accounting, and 
continued contributions of $2 billion a year for 6 years). 
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I. RHODE ISLAND HAS A UNIQUE LAW THAT ALLOWS SOLVENT 
INSURERS TO RESTRUCTURE THEIR BUSINESSES 
A. How the Unique Rhode Island Laws Were Created 
In 1995, Governor Lincoln Almond issued an Executive Order 
that created the Rhode Island Insurance Development Task Force 
(the Task Force).13 The Governor’s order also appointed the first 
nine members and assigned them to identify how Rhode Island 
could become a center of insurance excellence and recommend 
statutory or regulatory changes to effectuate that plan.14  The 
Task Force was to issue a report that the legislature could act 
upon, and by 2002, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted 
legislation that provided for the voluntary restructuring of solvent 
insurers.15 The bill that became what is now codified as Rhode 
Island General Laws Chapter 27-14.5 was sponsored by Senator 
William Irons, who was also one of Governor Almond’s initial nine 
appointees to the Task Force, filling the seat reserved for a 
member of the State’s General Assembly.16 
B. The Legislature Created a Legal Structure to Permit Voluntary 
Restructuring 
In 2002, the Legislature passed the law to allow voluntary 
restructuring, and Governor Almond signed the law in his last full 
year in office.17 However, the public law as enacted would only 
take effect once the Rhode Island Department of Business 
Regulation’s Division of Insurance (the Division) promulgated 
rules and regulations to effectuate the law,18 and once the 
Commissioner of Insurance certified that certain other 
preconditions had been met (regarding staffing in the Division).19 
The Division proposed a new regulation entitled Regulation 68— 
Commutation Plans on June 21, 2004, which took effect on 
 
 
13. R.I. Exec. Order No. 95-21, § I (Aug. 22, 1995), https://almond.apps. 
uri.edu/execord/95-21.html. 
14. Id. § II. 
15. 2002 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 381. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-14.5-6 (2017). 
19. 2002 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 381, § 3. 
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September 5, 2004.20 The regulation detailed the costs to an 
insurer that wished to commute business from a solvent insurer,21 
the items that the Division required in a plan, and the mechanical 
steps that an insurer would follow.22 Subsequent versions of the 
regulation added clarity to the process23 by implementing the best 
practices after the first commutation plan was enacted and 
addressed by the Rhode Island Superior Court,24 and broadened 
the scope of the regulation to allow insurance business transfers 
(IBTs).25 
The Rhode Island law and regulation now allow two unique 
functions that had not been previously available to insurers in the 
United States: commutations of solvent insurers and insurance 
business transfers. The commutation portion of the law and 
regulation allow that “a solvent insurance or reinsurance company 
in run-off may propose a commutation plan extinguishing its 
liabilities for past and future claims of its creditors and then 
terminate its business.”26 The more recently allowed IBT portion 
of the regulation allows that a mature and closed book of business 
may be transferred into a Rhode Island domestic insurer, and the 
contracts be novated by order of the Superior Court.27 Each of 
these mechanisms is somewhat unique in the United States, but 
both are based on well-established insurance systems in England, 
 
 
20. R.I. Dep’t of Business Regulation, Division of  Insurance, Regulation 
68, effective Sept. 5, 2004. In the past year, Insurance Regulation 68 has  
been recodified at 230 RICR 20-45-6 (LexisNexis 2018), but throughout this 
paper it will be referred to as Regulation 68 or 68 R.I. Ins. Reg. for 
consistency. 
21. 68 R.I. Ins. Reg. § 5(a) (Sept. 5, 2004) (recodified at 230 RICR 20-45-6 
(LexisNexis 2018)) (setting the amount as “$125,000 or such lesser amount as 
the Commissioner shall deem adequate,” in addition to costs associated to the 
Division’s review of the Plan). 
22. Id. § 4. 
23. In 2009, the Division added a definition and gave itself authority to 
modify or waive any of the requirements for “good cause shown” after a 
written application is made by the applicant. 68 R.I. Ins. Reg. §§ 3(B), 10(A) 
(Dec. 31, 2009) (recodified at 230 RICR 20-45-6 (LexisNexis 2018)). 
24. In 2014, the Division added several procedural steps and broke 
Section 4-Plan Procedure into five discrete steps. 68 R.I. Ins. Reg. §§ 3(B), 
10(A) (Jun. 21, 2014) (recodified at 230 RICR 20-45-6 (LexisNexis 2018)). 
25. 230 RICR 20-45-6.3(A)(11), -6.4 (LexisNexis 2018). 
26. In re GTE Reinsurance Co., No. PB 10-3777, 2011 WL 7144917, at 
*5–6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011). 
27. 230 RICR 20-45-6 (LexisNexis 2018). 
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other Commonwealth countries such as Bermuda,28 the European 
Union, and is not unheard of in courts in the United States 
because of the international nature of modern insurance and 
bankruptcy law.29 
C. Commutation Plans in Rhode Island 
Commutation plans represent one way that an insurer in run- 
off status might quickly wind down its affairs. A run-off company 
can exist for years beyond its useful life span, and indeed, there 
are many companies in regulator-mandated run-off that are 
required to pay claims, collect premiums, and wind down their 
businesses over years or decades.30 One of the problems with long-
lasting run-off companies is that every year, companies incur 
legal, accounting, regulatory, and other administrative costs. 
These costs take money away from the company’s stockpile of 
assets that it uses to pay future claims, and if done over a long 
enough time period, could eliminate an insurer’s ability to satisfy 
its creditors or pay the claims that it promised to pay. Instead of 
existing for decades and paying claims as they arise out of the 
dwindling investment proceeds, commutation plans allow an 
insurer to make an offer to the policyholder to extinguish the 
coverage. To do this, all parties usually rely on actuaries to 
determine the likelihood of a claim being filed and the likely 
severity of the claim to boil it down to a present value figure. This 
payment could come as a lump sum paid to each insured to 
 
 
28. See CONYERS DILL & PEARMAN, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT FOR 
INSURANCE COMPANIES IN BERMUDA (2017) (presenting a summary of the 
solvent scheme available in Bermuda based on Bermuda’s Companies Act of 
1981). 
29. See In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int’l Ins. Ltd., 238 B.R. 25, 35–37 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing the options available to distressed and 
solvent companies in Bermuda under their solvent schemes statute, finding 
many similarities to various aspects of United States’ bankruptcy law, 
including Chapter 11 for Bermuda’s solvent scheme). 
30. See James Veach et al, The New “Three Rs”: Regulators, Run-Off, 
and “Restructuring Mechanisms,” AIIROC MATTERS, Spring 2009, at 11–12, 
for an anecdote about a regulatory run-off company that went insolvent in  
the 1980’s, was ordered rehabilitated in 1985, and deferred in 2007—twenty- 
two years later—when the New York court was asked to close the liquidation. 
See also NEW YORK LIQUIDATION BUREAU, UNION INDEMNITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF NEW YORK (Feb. 19, 2018), http://www.nylb.org/UnionIndem.htm 
(providing additional information on the Union Indemnity liquidation). 
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extinguish the remaining insurance coverage, in essence 
reimbursing the insured for lack of continued insurance coverage. 
When regular (non-insurance) companies become insolvent, 
they usually turn to federal bankruptcy courts; however, 
insurance is state-regulated, and most states have laws that 
govern the conservation, rehabilitation, or liquidation of insurance 
companies.31 New York’s insurance regulators have used 
commutation plans in their rehabilitation of impaired or insolvent 
insurers since 1989, when the insurance commissioner sought that 
specific authority to commute reinsurance agreements in order to 
better carry out his duties.32 However, the New York  
commutation plans are only available to impaired or insolvent 
companies, and the New York legislature specifically said, “a 
commutation of a reinsurance agreement . . . shall not be voidable 
as a preference,”33 which both mean that it is not a  corollary to 
the United Kingdom or Rhode Island commutation plans.34 
There are a number of mechanical steps that the statute, 
regulation, and courts require in order to entertain and ultimately 
approve such a plan. The Legislature created certain steps to 
ensure fairness in the commutation plans for policyholders by 
requiring that insurers convince a substantial number of their 
insureds that the commutation plan makes sense for all parties. 
This was ensured by requiring a vote of the creditors for (or 
against) the plan, in addition to giving unsatisfied parties an 
opportunity to object to the plan in court.35 The Division must  
also approve the plan, which requires either adherence to the 
numerous requirements of Regulation 68 or a waiver for a specific 
subsection.36 Additionally, the statute requires that after the 
 
31. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, RECEIVER’S HANDBOOK FOR INSURANCE 
COMPANY INSOLVENCIES 5 (2016). 
32. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, §§ 128.0–128.6 (2018); see also 
SHEIK H. MOHAMED, N.Y. INS. DEP’T, REPORT ON EXAMINATION OF THE 
CONSTELLATION REINSURANCE COMPANY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009, at 7 (2010) 
(offering a brief recap on the company’s net impairment that was eliminated 
after the commutation plan, whereas it had been negative $12,432,161 
immediately prior to the plan). 
33. N.Y. INS. LAW § 7425(d) (McKinney 2016). 
34. NAIC WHITE PAPER 2010, supra note 4, at 16–18. 
35.  27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-14.5-4(b)(3)–(4) (2017). 
36. 230 RICR 20-45-6.7 (LexisNexis 2018) (providing for the modification 
or waiver of other regulatory requirements upon “good cause shown” by the 
requestor). 
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Division approves the plan, the applicant must petition the 
superior court to issue an order and make certain findings in 
approving the plan.37 The court must find that “implementation  
of the commutation plan would not materially adversely affect 
either the interests of the objecting creditors or the interests of the 
assumption policyholders.”38 One piece of evidence  the  court 
could look to for that finding is the requirement mentioned above 
that at least fifty percent of each class of creditors and the holders 
of seventy-five percent in value of the liabilities owed to each class 
of creditors vote for the plan.39 One might call the Rhode Island 
process a forced commutation whereby the court’s order can force 
insureds who did not approve the plan to surrender their coverage 
in exchange for money. An alternative approach could have been 
to let insurers simply negotiate with their policyholders to come to 
agreement over the amount to be paid,40 but any insurer and 
insured could reach such an agreement at any time without need 
for a court to approve it. And the efficiencies derived from the 
commutation and business transfer processes include that they 
may both proceed over the objection of some small number of 
parties.41 
This method of forced commutation is not without critics.42 
 
37. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-14.5-4(b)(1). 
38. Id. § 27-14.5-4(c)(1). 
39. Id. § 27-14.5-4(b)(4). 
40. Unfortunately, this creates a situation akin to a reverse Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. Because of the advantages to the insurer to eliminate their 
policyholders, the insurers might be willing to pay a premium in order to 
incentivize the last few holdouts to agree. But that might incentivize others 
to not accept an early payout in hope or fear that later payouts would be 
higher. Where the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma always leads to better 
outcomes for the prisoners for cooperating with the authorities, in these 
cases, policyholders seem to always benefit from withholding their 
cooperation with their insurer who wants to commute their business. 
41. See In re GTE Reinsurance Co., No. PB 10-3777, 2011 WL 7144917, 
at *20 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011). At issue in this case was the first 
commutation plan submitted and approved in Rhode Island, where five 
cedents (likely companies) had objected to the proposed plan at the meeting  
of the creditors. Id. The five cedents represented 2.13% of GTE RE’s total 
composite reserve, and the court approved the commutation plan in spite of 
the objectors. Id. 
42. See Susan Power Johnston, Why U.S. Courts Should Deny or 
Severely Condition Recognition to Schemes of Arrangement For Solvent 
Insurance Companies, 16 NORTON J. OF BANKR. L. & PRAC. 953 (2007) (citing 
concerns with the amounts that policyholders end up receiving on claims, 
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In the only instance where a commutation plan was considered by 
the Rhode Island courts, two of the insured parties objected and 
filed suit to oppose the court’s approval. In 2010, GTE re- 
submitted a commutation plan for approval under Rhode Island 
General Laws section 27-14.5 and Insurance Regulation 68.43 The 
plan was reviewed and eventually approved by the Division after 
an independent actuary had reviewed the proposal, and a petition 
was filed with the Rhode Island Superior Court.44 At an initial 
hearing, the court ruled that there would only be a single class of 
creditors45 for purposes of meeting and sufficiently approving the 
proposed plan both on the basis of a favorable vote by the majority 
of the members and of seventy-five percent of the value of 
liabilities owed to the single class of creditors.46 After the  
creditors met and voted on the proposed plan, the court held a 
fairness hearing to consider whether to ultimately approve the 
plan over the objection of several creditors.47 One of the five 
objecting creditors raised legal arguments with the court at the 
fairness hearing, including challenges to the constitutionality of 
the restructuring statute under several theories, including the 
contract clause and due process.48 In a well-written  opinion, 
Judge Silverstein addressed these concerns and found that the 
contract clause was not violated, in part because Bermuda has 
similar commutation-like laws; additionally, the court held that 
the Rhode Island Legislature had a significant and legitimate 
public    purpose,   and    the    Restructuring   Act   represented   a 
 
deficiencies in the notice that is given to insured, and other problems); see 
also Susan Power Johnston & Martin Beeler, Solvent Insurance Schemes 
Should Not Be Recognized [Reprised], 17 NORTON J. OF BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 
(2008) (reaffirming stance on solvent insurance schemes). But see Howard 
Seife & Francisco Vazquez, U.S. Courts Should Continue to Grant 
Recognition to Schemes of Arrangement of Solvent Insurance Companies, 17 
NORTON J. OF BANKR. L. & PRAC. 571, 571 (2008) (critiquing Johnston, Why 
U.S. Courts Should Deny or Severely Condition Recognition to Schemes of 
Arrangement For Solvent Insurance Companies, supra). 
43. In re GTE Reinsurance Co., 2011 WL 7144917, at *16. 
44. Id. at *18. 
45. Id. at *18–19. Creditors are more commonly known as policyholders 
or cedents, and, as GTE RE was a reinsurer, the policies it wrote had ceded 
GTE RE risks. 
46. Id. at *19–20. This procedure is required by 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27- 
14.5-4(b)(4). 
47. In re GTE Reinsurance Co., 2011 WL 7144917, at *20. 
48. Id. at *1. 
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“reasonable and necessary means by which to address a legitimate 
public purpose.”49 
The decision of In re GTE Reinsurance Co. has been well 
received by the Rhode Island legal community50 and beyond.51 
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not have an 
opportunity to review the constitutional matters or the 
commutation law itself because of the subsequent partial vocateur 
that allowed the settlement of two of the objectors, presumably at 
higher values of commutation than had previously been offered.52 
D. Insurance Business Transfers in Rhode Island 
The regulation issued pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws 
section 27-14.5 was amended in 2015 to allow for a second type of 
voluntary restructuring—the insurance business transfer.53 The 
United Kingdom had, for several decades, allowed insurance 
companies to transfer insurance policies from one solvent insurer 
to another, through a court sanctioned process that had since 2000 
been called a Part VII transfer. By the time Rhode Island 
amended its regulation, the United Kingdom had experienced 
fourteen years of evidence that Part VII transfers could work and 
help insurers without causing major harm on policyholders.  
Based on the statute’s rulemaking authority,54 the Division 
promulgated an addition to Regulation 68 that allowed insurers 
the ability to transfer business from another solvent insurer 
company into a Rhode Island domestic insurer, known as an 
 
 
49. Id. at *52, *59, *65. 
50. See John J. Partridge, Rhode Island’s Commutation Statute: 
Constitutional Issues Remain Open, 23 FORC J. 19 (2012). But see J.H. 
Oliverio, Note, The Great Instrument of Chicanery: An Appeal for Greater 
Judicial Scrutiny of Solvent Insurers’ Schemes of Arrangement, 17 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 439 (2012). One reason the decision was well received 
could be the fact that Rhode Island has a business calendar with a judge that 
is able to devote his full attention to business matters. See Administrative 
Order No. 2011-10 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2011). 
51. See Thomas F. Bush, Solvent Schemes Come To America, LAW 360 
(June 8, 2011, 1:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/248309/solvent- 
schemes-come-to-america. 
52. In re GTE Reinsurance Co., No. PB 10-3777, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 
4, at *3 (Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2012). 
53. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-14.5-4(e)(ii) (2017). 
54. Id. § 27-14.5-6. 
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Insurance Business Transfer (IBT).55 For policy reasons and to 
ensure that Rhode Island was setting a high bar with regards to 
this new kind of transfer in the United States, the transferring 
business was limited to commercial run-off business sold more 
than sixty months prior that had been part of a “closed book of 
business or a reasonably specified set of policies.”56 These 
restrictions together ensure that business being actively marketed 
is not immediately available to be commuted and operate as a 
minimum set of standards. To some, this signaled the opportunity 
to use both forms of voluntary restructuring together 
(commutation and IBT), to first transfer business into Rhode 
Island, and then commute the business once it was within the 
State.57 
II. RHODE ISLAND’S LAW IS BASED ON CONCEPTS THAT HAVE LONG 
EXISTED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
A. Solvent Schemes of Arrangement in the United Kingdom 
A scheme of arrangement (or commutation plan) is a court 
sanctioned U.K. process through which insurers take policies and 
exchange them with their policyholders for money, unwinding the 
insurance arrangement, or as the NAIC wrote “[a] scheme of 
arrangement is essentially a statutory compromise between a 
company and its creditors.”58 In 2006, the United Kingdom 
updated a 1985 law that specifically allowed judicially approved 
solvent schemes of arrangement.59 The 2006 update left the 
 
55. 230 RICR 20-45-6.2 (LexisNexis 2018). 
56. Id. pt. 6.4(A)(1). 
57. Andrew Rothseid, Cas. Actuarial Soc’y, U.S. Options for Accelerated 
Closure of Legacy Liabilities 42 (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.casact.org/ 
education/CLRS/2015/presentations/R-5.pdf. 
58. NAIC WHITE PAPER 2010, supra note 4, at 14. Also, note that the 
broad concept of “schemes of arrangement” or even “schemes” are viewed 
with some skepticism in the United States. But in the United Kingdom and 
other Commonwealth nations, several have similar insurance commutation 
plans available without any apparent negative connection to the term 
“schemes.” I will often replace scheme of arrangement for commutation 
because of the negative connotation in the United States. 
59. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 895–901 (Eng.); see Dominic McCahill, 
English Schemes of Arrangement Expand to Continental Europe and Beyond, 
SKADDEN INSIGHTS (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/insights/ 
publications/2014/01/english-schemes-of-arrangement-expand-to-continent 
(providing general information on U. K. schemes). 
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statute quite succinct, which continued to leave much of the 
process to the courts’ discretion. U.K. courts have established a 
history of cases exercising the power to commute business when 
presented with a reasonable plan that had the support of a 
majority of their insureds representing a supermajority of the 
value protected. 
Insurers can receive numerous benefits in using a 
commutation plan instead of continuing to service  the 
insurance.60 One benefit is the efficiency through which the 
process can be undertaken. Another is that a U.K. commutation 
plan can be approved without the full cooperation of all 
policyholders, and thus, could be approved even over the objection 
of a small number of policyholders. If there are objectors that 
disagree with the value to be paid to the policyholders under the 
plan, the court will give the matter greater scrutiny.  However,  
the court, ultimately, has the authority to move forward and 
approve the transaction regardless of such opposition, assuming 
the court concludes that the proposed plan is fair to the class 
members.61 
In those thirty years of U.K. law, a line of cases has 
established some helpful guidelines for the similar but distinct 
process. Under the 2006 U.K. Companies Act (and its  similar 
1985 predecessor), the process begins when a plan is submitted to 
the court. Unlike the Rhode Island commutation and Part VII 
transfers, there is no regulatory approval required for a U.K. 
commutation, and the plan is filed directly with the court.62 Next, 
 
 
60. Rothseid, supra note 57, at 23. 
61. One standard articulated by the courts in turning down 
commutation plans  has  been the  Buckley test, as identified in the  In re  
The British Aviation Ins. Co. decision. [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch.) [74] (Eng.). 
There, the court’s primary ruling was that the creditor meeting was 
insufficient, but it also opined that the Buckley test would have applied had 
the creditor meeting been sufficient, and that the plan would not have been 
approved for lacking fairness. Id. paras. 142–44. The Buckley test seems to 
derive from Buckley on the Companies Act, a longstanding treatise on U.K. 
corporate law dating to the 1872. Id. para. 74. One passage articulating the 
standard for approval of schemes in British Aviation citing Buckley is “that 
the court should normally sanction a scheme if: ‘the arrangement is such as 
an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in 
respect of his interest, might reasonably approve.’” Id. para. 74. 
62. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 896–7 (Eng.). Some believe a “no 
objection” letter from the Financial Services Authority regarding an insurer 
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the court reviews the plan for compliance with the statute, and 
then reviews the proposed classes  of policyholders.  If satisfied, 
the court can allow the plan’s proponents to proceed to host 
policyholder meetings, which requires notices and statements to 
be sent out and advertised.63 The law then requires that in each 
class a majority of the creditors present, in addition to seventy- 
five percent of the value to be commuted, must approve the plan 
as a condition to the court’s approval.64 U.K. courts can scrutinize 
these plans for reasons other than those raised by objectors, as 
they have considerable discretion in approving plans and 
responsibility to review other aspects of plans before issuing 
approval.65 Also as time has passed, more insureds have become 
aware of the risks that they would be taking on in the face of a 
commutation of their policy, leading to more policyholders raising 
better and more effective objections to these plans, and seeming to 
help ensure that all policyholders are treated appropriately.66 
 
that they regulate has some influence in the court approval process. 
MICHELLE KIERCE ET AL., SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT AND THEIR ONGOING 
CURRENCY 14 (2010), PLC Cross-Border Insurance and Reinsurance 
Handbook, reprinted in SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, https://www.sidley.com/~/ 
media/files/publications/2010/01/schemes-of-arrangement-and-their-ongoing- 
currency/files/view-article/fileattachment/schemes-of-arrangement-and-their- 
ongoing-currenc .pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
63. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 897 (Eng.). 
64. Id. § 899(1). 
65. See, e.g., In re Hawk Ins. Co., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 241. There, the 
lower court had previously denied a scheme of arrangement plan based upon 
her own judgment and absent objectors, including whether there should have 
been multiple classes of shareholders, and specifically, whether IBNR 
shareholders should be in the same group as more recognized claimants. Id. 
para. 7. On appeal, Justices Pill, Chadwick and Wright overturned that 
decision and allowed the scheme to continue, in part because there had not 
been any objectors to the plan before the lower court. Id. para. 6. Their 
decision was based on the 1985 law, and that law had required 3 steps for 
approval. Id. para. 11. The appeals court found that the trial court had 
initially approved the proposed plan in the first approval stage, allowed 
notices to be distributed to the impacted policyholders, and then denied 
approval in the third stage without any policyholders objecting. Id. para. 21. 
66. One such well-argued objection to a proposed commutation plan was 
the proposed scheme in the In re British Aviation decision. [2005] EWHC 
1621 (Ch.) (Eng.). There, the justice dismissed certain objections to the 
scheme, but determined that the class meeting had not been properly 
provided because he determined that there should have been two classes of 
creditors: those with current claims, and those with Incurred but Not 
Reported (IBNR) claims. Id. paras. 91–92, 97; see KIERCE ET AL., supra note 
62, at 14. Current claims have already occurred, and the parties are aware of 
 2018] INSURANCE LAW 483 
 
B. Transfers of Insurance Business in the United Kingdom 
Part VII transfers have been a part of U.K. law since 2000, 
when the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 modernized 
insurance business transfers in England in its seventh part, titled 
Part VII—Control of Business Transfers.67 Part VII  transfers 
have established a growing utility in the United Kingdom, in part 
likely influenced by their flexibility, and the fact that no Part VII 
transferor has encountered financial difficulties.68 
Once a company has decided to conduct a Part VII transfer, 
the transferee must prepare a plan that would identify the 
liabilities and assets being transferred from one company to 
another, identify the notice that they intend to circulate to 
insureds, identify the opportunity to object to the plan, among 
other requirements.69 This plan is referred to in England as the 
Scheme Document, and it requires the approval of the U.K 
regulators before it can be submitted to the court.70 In the United 
Kingdom, there are two regulators with authority over these 
transfers, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), both taking roles in the 
process and review of Part VII plans.71 Then, a Part VII transfer 
 
 
them, but IBNR claims are less certain to lead to a claim because they have 
not been reported yet by definition and are more difficult to quantify. To 
resolve this, actuaries could offer opinions as to how likely such an event is, 
and thus can assign a future value to such events.), and thus two meetings 
and two separate votes. 
67. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, §§ 104–117. 
Previously this Act had been codified in the United Kingdom Insurance 
Companies Act of 1982. Insurance Companies Act, 1982, c. 50, §§ 49–52 
(Eng.). 
68. See also Luann M. Petrellis, Welcome to the New World of Run-off, 11 
AIRROC MATTERS 6, 7 (2015) (stating several uses for Part VII transfers for 
U.K. insurers in addition to extolling the virtues of insurance business 
transfers in general for insurers, and for the transferring and assuming of 
companies). 
69. See infra note 71. 
70. Id. 
71. The English Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and their 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) both have oversight over Part VII 
transfers. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 §108(1) 
(authorizing that “the Treasury may impose by regulation impose 
requirements under Section 107”). The FCA leads the review, but the PRA 
has published guidance on the topic. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PROPOSED 
GUIDANCE ON OUR APPROACH TO THE REVIEW OF PART VII INSURANCE BUSINESS 
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requires several approvals during its process, including ultimately 
the approval of the High Court, which issues the order novating 
the contracts. Their reviews can take several months to conclude, 
including actuarial review, to ensure that sufficient ability to pay 
the transferred claims exists.72 Once the regulators are satisfied 
and notice is disseminated, there is another required waiting 
period to ensure that insureds have both received the notice and 
had sufficient time to review it.73 After the notice process is 
approved and notice is disseminated, a time period is allowed for 
any policyholders to object to the transfer. If policyholders object, 
the court is more likely to scrutinize the transfer.74 One of the 
final pieces of the Part VII process is the court order, which 
applies to all members of the class, regardless of objecting status. 
C. Cases in the United States Acknowledging Solvent Schemes 
and Part VII Transfers 
Although there has been limited experience in the U.S. courts 
in approving commutations and insurance business transfers, 
some U.S. courts have had opportunities to review these issues 
because European, U.K., and American insurers have been 
involved with U.K.-based commutations or transfers. Since the 
2000 and 2005 revisions to U.K. laws, solvent schemes and Part 
VII Transfers have been employed much more frequently in the 
 
 
TRANSFERS 11 (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/guidance- 
consultation/gc17-05.pdf. 
72. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 71, at 15. English actuaries rely 
on a 99.5% confidence level that the transferred business will be able to pay 
claims for the first year after the transfer. This standard is not unique for 
Part VII transfers. It is the U.K. general standard for insurance regulatory 
capital and is based on the FSA’s adoption of Solvency II capital standards. 
See FIN. SERVICES AUTH., INSURANCE SECTOR BRIEFING: RISK AND CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT UPDATE (2008), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/isb_risk_ 
update.pdf. 
73. See Insurance Business Transfers, MILLIAM BRIEFING (Milliam, Inc., 
U.K.), Aug. 2017, at 1, http://careers.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/Solutions/ 
email-marketing/Insurance-Business-Transfers.pdf. 
74. See In re Hawk Ins. Co., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 241. There, a U.K. 
appeals court overturned the lower court’s denial that raised issues on its 
own without objections to the proposed commutation scheme.  Id. para. 21.  
As of this writing, the author is unaware of another Part VII case with a 
similar denial for lack of objectors with a subsequent overturn on appeal, but 
the Hawk decision might guide any such future cases. 
 2018] INSURANCE LAW 485 
United Kingdom.75 This has led to more frequent reviews by U.S. 
courts of the underlying U.K. transactions due to financial 
markets becoming more interconnected. Some of the impact on  
the United States is felt in bankruptcy courts, which often are 
implicated because U.S. policyholders obtain coverage from U.K.- 
based insurers on such a regular basis, while others involve non- 
bankruptcy situations, such as when a policyholder wants to 
submit a claim for payment, but no longer has coverage.76 
There are several interesting cases that provide guidance to 
Rhode Island courts. One such case, Narragansett Electric Co. v. 
American Home Assurance Co., involved damage dating back over 
sixty years.77 In Narragansett Electric Co., the court reviewed 
claims by London-based insurer, Equitas, that the plaintiff had 
sued the wrong insurer.78 Equitas argued that it had  not  
assumed the obligations at issue.79 As the court summarized, 
“Equitas’s motion to dismiss raises the question whether this 
[Part VII] transfer of insurance obligations from Lloyd’s to  
Equitas is effective and enforceable under U.S. law.”80 First, the 
court decided that it was sitting in diversity jurisdiction and that 
 
 
75. See SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, PART VII TRANSFERS EFFECTUATED PURSUANT 
TO THE UK FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT 2000 (2017), 
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/publications/part-vii-transfers.pdf. 
76. See Jennifer D. Morton, Note, Recognition of Cross-Border Insolvency 
Proceedings: An Evaluation of Solvent Schemes of Arrangement and Part VII 
Transfers under U.S. Chapter 15, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1312, 1314–15 
(2006). 
77. See No. 11 Civ. 8299(PKC), 2012 WL 4075171 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 
2012). Oddly enough, this was a Rhode Island utility and involved a claim 
originating in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, but with waste disposed near 
Attleboro, Massachusetts (the next town over, but across the state line). Id.  
at *1–2. In subsequent decisions in related matters, the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court found that Massachusetts law would govern whether the 
pollution was discharged in sudden and accidental ways. OneBeacon  
America Ins. Co. v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 57 N.E.3d 18, 24 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2016). 
78. Narragansett Elec. Co., 2012 WL 4075171, at *2; see Steven E. 
Sigalow & Richard E. Stewart, How Lloyd’s Saved Itself, 37 THE INS. FORUM 
(2010), reprinted in JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/dae 
28676-d6c8-4de6-9cbb-c05aee419d4b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
533860ba-d4f1-4056-85d9-78b84dc71af5/How%20Lloyd’s%20Saved%20 
Itself.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
79. Narragansett Elec. Co., 2012 WL 4075171, at *2. 
80. Id. 
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the appropriate substantive law to apply was English.81 Next, the 
court discussed a prior District Court case where another Part VII 
transfer was discussed at length and not recognized as a foreign 
bankruptcy proceeding.82 In reaching a conclusion to not dismiss 
the claims against the Equitas defendants, the court relied on a 
letter sent by Equitas to American policyholders notifying them 
that Equitas was assuming the obligations of the original 
insurer.83  The court found that regardless of whether the Part  
VII had any effect, the letter sent to American policyholders raised 
sufficient basis to let the suit continue.84 Equitas attempted to 
argue that the Part VII transfer did not state that it would become 
effective in the United States, rather that it was only effective in 
certain countries of Europe.85 Nevertheless, the utility company 
alleged that it had not relied on the English High Court Order 
executing the Part VII transfer, but rather relied on the notice 
letter it received as the evidence of obligation by the new named 
insurer.86 
Another case, Air & Liquid System Corp. v. Allianz Insurance 
Co., dealt with an interesting discovery dispute as to whether a 
policyholder impacted by a Part VII transaction could later have 
access to the information that went into a U.K.’s independent 
expert’s report.87 Ultimately, the special master in the District 
Court allowed discovery to proceed with a not-inconvenient 
deposition of the expert.88 Allianz Insurance Co. is an example of 
one way that Part VII transfers can be used to add complication to 
an insurance coverage dispute, embroiling all involved in later 
litigation. Allianz Insurance Co. also shows how the approval of 
such a transfer, even though well vetted originally, can later come 
under scrutiny in unintended or unforeseen locations. 
Allainz Insurance Co. concerned General Star, which wrote 
policies for excess coverage outside the United States for only 
three years, 1998–2000, and then was put into runoff and ceased 
 
81. Id. at *8. 
82. Id. at *9. 
83. Id. at *10. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. 
87. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. Allianz Ins. Co., No. 2:11-CV-00247-JFC, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121553 (W.D.P.A. 2012). 
88. Id. at *59. 
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writing new policies.89 By 2010, it had substantially wound down 
its business and decided to transfer its policies to a new insurer 
via a Part VII transfer.90 Both General Star (the transferor) and 
the transferee taking over the policies shared an ultimate parent 
company—Berkshire Hathaway.91 At issue here was whether the 
expert who opined on the Part VII transfer had properly included 
one particular U.S.-based insured, Howden North America, and  
all three policies it had purchased from General Star.92 That 
insurance contract had been for excess coverage, and Howden had 
informed General Star of 13,500 potential asbestos related claims 
that were likely to exceed the initial layers of insurance, making it 
likely that the General Star excess policy would be required to pay 
out claims.93 The real issue at play in Allianz Insurance Co. 
seemed to be that the post-Part VII insurer was put into voluntary 
liquidation days after the Part VII transfer concluded, leading to 
questions about whether and how the independent expert had 
valued Howden’s potential asbestos claims.94 
In the In re Board of Directors of Hopewell International 
Insurance Ltd. decision, a New York bankruptcy judge analyzed a 
scheme of arrangement that occurred in Bermuda, and applied 
Bermuda law, rather than the requested Minnesota law.95 The 
court further determined that, given the location of the 
petitioner’s assets, respondents had failed to object to the scheme 
as proposed when they had been provided notice, and that 
petitioner had been subjected to a foreign proceeding, it had 
jurisdiction. As such, the court enjoined the respondent from 
taking action against petitioner based on the underlying action.96 
 
89. Id. at *10. 
90. Id. at *11–12. 
91. Id. at *12. This interrelated nature is not unusual and is referred to 
as an intra-company transaction. 
92. See id. at *8–10. 
93. See id. at *9, *15–16. 
94. See id. at *15–16. 
95. In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int’l Ins. Ltd., 238 B.R. 25, 31–32 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
96. See id. Written by then the chief United States bankruptcy judge in 
the Southern District of New York Tina Brozman, this decision detailed 
relevant history behind the Bermuda schemes of arrangement, including the 
different methods available to companies. Id. at 35. One arrangement 
involves a cut-off scheme, developed in 1995, in which companies have no 
more than five years to submit additional claims prior to a bar date. Id. at 
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The court in Hopewell also recognized the Bermuda scheme as one 
qualifying as a foreign proceeding under U.S. Bankruptcy Code.97 
III. VERMONT WAS AN EARLY STATE TO ALLOW FOR INSURANCE 
BUSINESS TRANSFERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In 2013, Vermont adopted a law that would allow companies 
to transfer closed blocks of certain insurance coverage into 
Vermont-based companies through a regulatory approval 
process.98 The Legacy Insurance Management Act (LIMA) lays  
out mechanisms akin to those existing in the United Kingdom and 
other traditional locations for insurance business transfers.99 
However, there are a few key differences in LIMA that companies 
might have noted, which could be keeping the act from being 
utilized as frequently as the U.K. version.100 Additionally, it 
appears that, at least through early 2018, the mechanisms created 
in LIMA have not been utilized by any insurers. 
 
 
35–36. This scheme had its advantages in that it greatly reduced the time for 
a run-off to wind down its business. See id. 
97. Id. at 48 (citing to 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2012)). The court applied a 
standard that “a foreign proceeding is a foreign judicial or administrative 
process whose end is to liquidate the foreign estate, adjust its debts or 
effectuate its reorganization.” Id. at 49 (internal quotations omitted). 
98. See Legacy Insurance Management Act, 2014 Vt. Acts & Resolves 93 
(codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 7111–7121 (West 2017)). 
99. See Anna Petropoulos, Vermont’s new law enables smooth transfer of 
legacy  insurance portfolios, APETROP USA (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://apetropusa.com/2014/04/08/vermonts-new-law-enables-smooth- 
transfer-of-legacy-insurance-portfolios/;   see   also   VT.   STAT.   ANN.   tit.   8, 
§ 7112(b)(1)–(21). This section identifies what is required in the plan 
submitted to the Commissioner for approval, including: identify what is to be 
transferred; identify the insureds; a no-objection letter from the domicile 
regulator; audited financials and annual statements; actuarial opinion that 
“quantifies the liabilities to be transferred”; three years of pro-forma financial 
statements showing the assuming company to be solvent; sign-off from the 
assuming company’s officers; copy of the notice to be given to policyholders; 
statement about pending disputes; and, business plan, investment policies, 
etc. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 7112(b)(1)–(21). This section also lays out the 
other requirements of the Act, such as subsection (d)’s requirement for the 
Commissioner to let the applicant know if their application is complete  
within  10  days  of  filing,  and  subsections  (h)’s  timing  requirement.     Id. 
§§ 7112(d), 7112(h). 
100. See Andrew Rothseid, Cutting on the Gordian Knot on Run Off 
Insurance, 1 INT’L CORP. RESCUE, 373, 376–77 (2016) (summarizing 
differences between the Rhode Island and Vermont LIMA business transfer 
processes and identifying similar concerns). 
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One major limitation of LIMA could be its scope, which may 
have been set as intentionally smaller than the U.K. predecessor. 
Several things limit the scope of LIMA, including the types of 
insurance eligible, the ability of policyholders to exclude 
themselves, and the exclusion of policies that prohibit such 
transfers. In LIMA’s findings and purpose, the statute identifies 
that its goal is to target non-admitted insurance and 
reinsurance,101 and its definition of “closed block” operates to 
restrict LIMA transfers to only non-admitted or reinsurance 
business.102 LIMA allows objecting policyholders to  essentially 
opt out of the plan (i.e., not be transferred) by simply identifying 
their policy and an objection to the plan.103 The fact that 
policyholders can withdraw themselves from the plan means that 
any insurer considering such a transfer might need to 
affirmatively court each policyholder to ensure that the desired 
goals are accomplished. Additionally, the process is specifically 
limited to exclude policies that would violate a provision of the 
underlying insurance or reinsurance contract.104 
Another concern with the statute is that the final sign-off 
approving the transfer is provided on a regulatory—and not a 
judicial—basis.105 Having a regulatory and not a statutory 
approval process could limit the ability of the transferor to shield 
itself from future suits in other jurisdictions. Parties dissatisfied 
with the Commissioner’s final order or the regulatory process are 
not without options, as they can go to the Vermont Supreme Court 
 
 
 
101. 2013 Vt. Acts & Resolves 93. 
102. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 7111(2). 
103. See id. § 7112(j) (stating that in response to a timely objection “the 
assuming company shall, not later than 15 days after the end of the comment 
period, submit to the Commissioner either (1) an amended list of policies . . . 
excluding such policyholder . . . or (2) an express written notice from such 
policyholder . . . accepting the plan and consenting to the transfer having the 
full force and effect of a statutory novation . . . and withdrawing and 
rescinding its prior notice of objection”). Basically, under LIMA, the objector 
must either be satisfied or be cut out of the plan altogether. 
104. Id. § 7112(l) explicitly limits the process if the contract or 
reinsurance agreement to be transferred has a provision prohibiting the 
transfer without the consent of the policyholder. While United Kingdom and 
Rhode Island regulators or courts might well intend to exclude such policies, 
they do so implicitly, rather than explicitly. 
105. Id. § 7114(a). 
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to appeal the Commissioner’s order.106 Nonetheless, since the 
LIMA action concludes with a regulatory action, a question could 
arise on appeal of what level of judicial scrutiny would apply on 
appeal. One might argue that the Administrative Procedures Act 
of Vermont would apply, and that the court should defer to the 
agency approving the proposed transfer. Moreover, a Vermont 
Supreme Court decision, State Department of Taxes v. Tri-State 
Industrial Laundries, certainly implies that the review of the 
administrative case here would receive deferential review, in that 
“the actions of agencies are correct, valid and reasonable, absent a 
clear and convincing showing to the contrary.”107 Although, 
another concern arising from the regulatory order is how the 
courts of other states would treat such an administrative order. It 
is uncertain if a non-Vermont court would grant a similar level of 
deference, and further, if such a court might consider whether this 
level of decision could benefit from the full faith and credit of other 
states, or if it would be accepted by other states under the doctrine 
of comity.108 Many courts and commenters have touched on 
 
106. Id. § 7115(b) (requiring that aggrieved parties appeal to the Vermont 
Supreme Court). 
107. State Dep’t of Taxes v. Tri-State Indus. Laundries, 415 A.2d 216, 218 
(1980). But see In re Agency of Admin., State Bldgs. Div., 444 A.2d 1349, 
1350–51 (1982) (overturning a state agency decision as lacking sufficient 
basis, even as it articulated administrative case would receive deference on 
the factual matters and would only be overturned if they were to go beyond 
their enabling legislation or were clearly erroneous). Nevertheless, a 
dissenting Justice wrote that the court should follow the “construction of a 
statute by those charged with its execution . . . unless there are compelling 
indications that it is wrong.” Id. at 1362 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
108. In insurance transactions, there exists an underlying contract 
between two parties, where the issuer agreed to pay certain amounts if a 
specified or fortuitous event occurs.  If a contract was novated pursuant to  
the LIMA process, would such a novation be respected by courts in other 
states? An example might help. Let us assume that an insured had moved 
and never received notice under the plan and submitted a claim the following 
year to the transferring company, well after the Final Order issued and 
appeal rights were extinguished. Presumably, the transferring insurer would 
deny the claim and point to the LIMA final administrative order, as they had 
believed their obligations under that contract were novated by the action.  
But a court in another state might add additional scrutiny later and might 
not rely on the Vermont administrative order, and it might not be as clear to 
the other court that the bargained for insurance had truly ceased. In what 
might be a closer call, look at the same example but assume that the 
administrative order had been challenged to the Vermont Superior Court, 
which upheld the administrative order, but did grant deference to the agency 
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whether administrative decisions are sufficient to satisfy the Full 
Faith and Credit or Comity clauses of the Constitution,109 and it 
might be that the more akin to a court proceeding the Vermont 
process is, the more likely it is to be upheld.110 It is possible that 
the state-based regulatory scheme in which insurers operate 
demand more cooperation and deference to other states’ laws and 
regulatory orders, such as when insurance companies are no 
longer able to pay their claims and state insurance departments 
need to take action to rehabilitate or liquidate the companies.111 
A method of voluntary restructuring in Rhode Island or 
elsewhere would not be very effective if it was not also recognized 
by the other states in the United States and  beyond.112  The 
notion that the courts of one state respect those of other states is 
deeply engrained in American culture. Court judgments and 
decisions receive such respect due to the inclusion of two similar 
clauses in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution: the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause113 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.114 
The United States Supreme Court has said “[n]o law has any 
 
 
during its review. Would that then receive the full respect during the other 
court’s review? 
109. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); 
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); see also 
William Daniel Benton, Application of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 
to EPA Overfiling, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 199, 244 (1988). But see New 
York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914) (rejecting Missouri’s 
application of Missouri law in its interpretation of its life insurance contract’s 
loan agreement that was negotiated in New York between a New York 
insurer and a resident of New Mexico). The Head decision has been favorably 
cited for this limitation on extraterritorial application of state  laws.  See 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003); BMW 
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 n.16 (1996). 
110. See Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 421–22. 
111. See Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 564 N.Y.S. 2d 54, 
55 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990) (upholding a lower court’s granting of full faith and 
credit to the administrative order of the Vermont insurance department).  
The court noted the granting of full faith and credit previously in New Jersey 
and that there was a model law created to provide a uniform system for the 
orderly and equitable administration of assets and liabilities of defunct multi- 
state insurers mandates such recognition. Id. 
112. See HAROLD S. HORWICH, STATE OF CONN. INS. DEP’T., FINAL REPORT 
OF THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON INSURANCE COMPANY RUN-OFF AND 
REORGANIZATION 11 (2006), http://www.ct.gov/cid/lib/cid/rptrunoff.pdf. 
113. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
114. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
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effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from 
which its authority is derived.”115 Thus, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause are two 
methods emanating from the U.S. Constitution that courts use to 
recognize court orders in other states. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause, also referred to as the 
Doctrine of Comity, is based on mutual recognition of foreign 
proceedings.116 More than one hundred years ago, in a matter 
regarding a New York merchant’s operations in Paris that led to a 
suit brought by a French consumer, the United States Supreme 
Court refused to grant comity to the judgement of a French court 
because the French court would not have recognized a U.S. 
judgement under similar circumstances.117 
On the other hand, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is a 
means to prohibit multiple states from exercising jurisdiction over 
the same matter, case, or controversy with divergent results.118 
The Supreme Court has explained that 
[o]urs is a union of States, each having its own judicial 
system capable of adjudicating the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties brought before it. Given  
this structure, there is always a risk that two or more 
States will exercise their power over the same case or 
controversy, with the uncertainty, confusion, and delay 
that necessarily accompany relitigation of the same 
issue.119 
The clause really is a method of applying res judicata and 
collateral estoppel to cases from other jurisdictions. In order for 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to apply and for a decision be 
respected later by other jurisdictions, courts look to whether the 
initial court had jurisdiction over the matter.120 
 
 
115. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
116. See id. (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the 
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to 
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another.”). 
117. Id. at 228–29. 
118. Id. at 185. 
119. Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health 
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 703–04 (1982). 
120. Id. at 704. 
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IV. CONNECTICUT ADOPED A LAW ALLOWING THE DIVISION OR MERGER 
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, ADAPTING THE MORE EXPANSIVE 
PENNSLYVANIA AND ARIZONA LAWS FOR INSURANCE 
In 2017, Connecticut adopted a new law that would allow 
domestic insurance companies to divide or merge through a 
regulatory process.121 Effective October 1, 2017, the Connecticut 
law authorized the Connecticut Division of Insurance to approve 
either the division of an insurer or the combination of an insurer 
with a newly formed company.122 This law allows domestic 
insurers to divide into two or more insurers pursuant to a plan of 
division that meets the requirements of nine sections of the law 
and gains the insurance commissioner’s approval.123 
Connecticut’s law appears to be very similar to recent laws 
adopted in Pennsylvania124 and Arizona125 that allow for  
divisions of corporations.126 The Pennsylvania and Arizona laws 
are broader and not only limited to insurance companies, as they 
 
121. H.B. 7025, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017). 
122. Alexander R. Cochran et al., Connecticut Adopts Act Authorizing 
Domestic Insurers to Divide, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2017/05/connecticut-adopts- 
act. 
123. On December 4, 2017, The Hartford announced the sale of a 
subsidiary in run-off, Talcott Resolution, to a group of outside investors. See 
The Hartford Announces Agreement to Sell Talcott Resolution, THE HARTFORD 
NEWSROOM (Dec. 4, 2017), https://newsroom.thehartford.com/press- 
release/hartford-announces-agreement-sell-talcott-resolution. It is unclear 
that this sale involved Connecticut’s newly authorized division statute or 
would subsequently involve a merger of certain business into a separate 
company not be to be sold off with the rest of Talcott. But one could imagine 
insurers reorganizing certain assets under this law to prepare for a sale of a 
non-core legacy business and unlock capital by selling the assets off, as this 
sale did. See An Act Authorizing Domestic Insurers to Divide: Hearing on CT 
H.B. 7025 (NS) Before the Comm. on Ins. & Real Estate, Jan. Sess., 2017 No. 
3549 (Conn. 2017) (statement of Cliff Leach, Vice President, Government 
Affairs of the Hartford). In that testimony, Leach identified roadblocks that 
insurance managers have in exiting insurance markets, such as Hartford’s 
2012 exit of certain life insurance markets. Id. 
124. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 361–368 (2017). 
125. S.B. 353, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013) amended many sections of 
law, including ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10–22 (2017) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 29-2101 through 2703. 
126. William D. Goddard, Connecticut offers more options for insurers 
exiting  lines of business, BUS.   INS., (Oct. 2, 2017, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20171002/ISSUE0401/912316228/ 
Business-Insurance-Perspectives-Connecticut-options-insurers-exit-lines. 
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appear to allow the division of any corporate entity and are not 
codified under the insurance laws in either state. Connecticut’s 
law creates a series of terms using the word “organic,”127 in an 
attempt to clarify which rules the entity must follow and their 
derivation.128 The terms seem intended to identify that the 
insurers operate across many states and are subject to state based 
regulation which could lead to multiple sets of rules for a book of 
business. They also reflect that many insurance company 
documents are proprietary and not subject to public scrutiny, even 
though the companies are regulated by a public entity who has 
access to such documents.129 The use of such definitions may in 
fact help an entity going through a division in a public process to 
maintain confidentiality of such documents. 
V. OKLAHOMA IS CONSIDERING ADOPTING A LAW TO ALLOW PART VII 
TRANSFERS 
Oklahoma had proposed legislation in 2017 that would have 
created a commutation process within the Insurance 
Department.130 The bill eventually was held, and a Joint 
Legislative Committee was created to consider the concept and 
possibly recommend a proposal.131 On January 17, 2018, the 
Oklahoma Senate proposed a bill that would instead create an 
insurance business transfer process.132 That bill proposes to 
 
 
127. “Organic rule,” “organic law,” and “public organic document.” See 
H.B. 7025, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ (13), (14), (17) (Conn. 2017). 
128. Id. § (1). This section appears to be copied from § 102 and § 312 of 
the Corporations and Unincorporated Associations Section of the 
Pennsylvania General Laws. Compare id. with 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 102, 
312. 
129. Compare the definition of public organic document to the internal 
entity controls that are not always known to the public—private organic 
rules. See Conn. H.B. 7025 §§ (15), (17). 
130. S.B. 606, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017) was proposed and had 
considerable support, passing the senate on three occasions, and seemingly 
passing a majority house vote as well. See Bill Information for SB 606, OKLA. 
STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill= 
SB606&Session=1700 (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). 
131. The Joint Interim Study of Insurance Business Transfer Plans had 
its first and only meeting on October 26, 2017 to receive testimony, in person 
or via Skype, from a number individuals and groups, including the author of 
this Article. 
132. S.B. 1101, 56th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2018). The new Oklahoma bill 
appears to have adopted many of the better aspects of the U.K. Part VII 
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create a legal process that would first involve the Oklahoma 
Insurance Department and their courts.133 
The current proposed bill seems to have many of the 
advantages of Rhode Island’s Insurance Business Transfers. It  
has a section that gives jurisdiction to the District Court in 
Oklahoma County to carry out provisions of the Act, including 
approval of the proposed insurance transfer.134 The bill also 
proposes that the applicant provide notice to the appropriate 
regulators, guarantee associations, reinsurers, and known 
policyholders.135 Section 6 of the proposal includes  the  
submission of the business transfer plan to the Oklahoma 
Insurance Department for initial approval of the plan, the use of 
an independent expert to opine on the impact of the plan, 
including its impact on policyholders.136 And section 6C gives the 
court the authority to receive comments and then, after a 
determination that the plan would not materially adversely affect 
the policyholders, the court has the authority to approve the 
transfer of the business, novating the original contracts.137 
One of the only distinctions between the Rhode Island IBT 
process and Oklahoma’s 2018 proposal is that the Rhode Island 
process is limited to mature blocks of certain kinds of business to 
be transferred, while Oklahoma’s process is not so limited. The 
Oklahoma proposal has similar restrictions on the kinds of 
business that are limited, but does not have a maturation 
requirement in its current proposal. In theory, this could mean 
that a 2017 insurance policy could be transferred from the carrier 
that sold it to a new carrier, over the objection of the 
policyholder.138 
 
 
 
transfer and the Rhode Island Reg. 68, whereas the 2017 bill had “looked like 
the love child of the laws introduced by Vermont and Rhode Island.” See Dan 
Ascher, The Rhode Ahead, INSIDER Q., Summer 2017, 
https://www.insiderquarterly.com/the-rhode-ahead. 
133. See Okla. S.B. 1101 § 6, which proposes an approval process for the 
Department, followed by an approval process for their courts. 
134. See id. § 4. 
135. See id. § 5. 
136. See id. § 6. 
137. See id. § 6C. 
138. But only if the Insurance Division had first approved the 
transaction, and the court later approves the proposal as well. See id. § 6. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY CHARTS 
Insurance companies have identified a need to unlock capital 
that is held in reserve from decades-old policies. Various 
jurisdictions have developed methods to help insurers unlock that 
value while also creating protections for policyholders in their 
processes. The United Kingdom has the longest history with Part 
VII transfers to move policies from one company to another and 
solvent schemes of arrangement to facilitate a faster winding 
down of an insurer’s business. Modeled after those two laws, 
Rhode Island has created two methods of voluntary restructuring 
that achieve many of the goals that insurers seek. Several other 
states have adopted, or are proposing, laws authorizing something 
similar to the U.K.’s Part VII law, but currently only Rhode Island 
has a substantially similar law to the U.K. Part VII transfer. 
One trend that appears on the rise is more aware and better 
represented policyholders who are able to articulate the reasons 
that the proposed voluntary restructuring may not be the best 
situation for themselves. Thus, the more and the better that 
policyholders are able to represent themselves in both the 
administrative and judicial processes, the better the system will 
have to become. Furthermore, several cases have pointed to a 
developing trend that not all future claims should be treated 
equally. Specifically, in In re GTE Reinsurance, the  court 
approved a single class of creditors, and there, it was likely the 
most appropriate choice.139 But future courts should look to cases 
from England, such as In re Hawk Insurance or In re British 
Aviation, for thoughtful guidance on whether to consider IBNR 
claims as a part of a combined creditor class or whether to treat 
them as a separate class of claims.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139. In re GTE Reinsurance Co., No. PB 10-3777, 2011 WL 7144917 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011). 
140. In re British Aviation Ins. Co., [2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch.) [140]–[141] 
(Eng.); In re Hawk Ins. Co., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 241 [11]–[12], [15]–[17]. 
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SUMMARY OF VARIOUS VOLUNTARY RESTRUCTURING OPTIONS: 
BUSINESS TRANSFERS 
 
 
Court 
Approval 
 
Binding 
on   
Objectors 
Independent 
Expert 
Opinion 
Required 
 
Notice 
Required to 
Policyholders 
Approval/Non- 
Objection 
from 
Transferor 
Regulator 
 
Policies 
Subject to 
Transfer 
 
 
U.K. Part 
VII 
Transfers 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
Most 
allowed 
(Part VII, 
Sec. 105 
has some 
exclusions) 
 
 
RI 
Insurance 
Business 
Transfers 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
Mature (60 
mo.+), 
closed  
book, no 
life, W.C. or 
personal 
lines 
 
 
 
Vermont 
 
 
No, 
regulatory 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
Closed 
block (60 
mo.+) 
surplus 
lines or 
reinsurance 
 
 
Connecticut 
 
 
No, 
regulatory 
Yes, but 
Sec. 8 
gives right 
to 
appraisal 
 
 
Not required, 
but available 
 
Yes, and likely 
a public 
hearing too 
N/A. To divide, 
must be 
domestic CT 
insurer 
 
Seemingly 
any line or 
type 
Oklahoma 
2018 SB 
1101 
Yes, as 
proposed 
Yes, as 
proposed 
Yes, as 
proposed 
Yes, as 
proposed 
Yes, as 
proposed 
No 
proposed 
restrictions 
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SUMMARY OF VARIOUS VOLUNTARY RESTRUCTURING OPTIONS: 
COMMUTATIONS 
 
 
Initial 
Regulator 
Approval 
 
Creditor 
Vote 
 
Notice 
Required 
Binding 
on   
Objectors 
 
Court 
Approval 
 
Limitations 
on Policies 
 
 
U.K. Solvent 
Schemes of 
Arrangement 
 
 
 
No 
Yes, more 
than 50% of 
creditors 
representing 
>75% of 
value 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
RI Reg. 68 
Commutations 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes, more 
than 50% of 
creditors 
representing 
>75% of 
value 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
Mature (60 
mo.+), closed 
book, no life, 
W.C. or 
personal 
lines 
 
Oklahoma 
2017 SB 606 
(no longer 
proposed) 
 
 
N/A (only 
regulatory 
approval) 
Yes, more 
than 50% of 
creditors 
representing 
>75% of 
value 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 
No Life, 
W.C. or 
personal 
lines 
 
